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Golden Flies: Egypt’s Pharaonic Past
in Multiple Mirrors
Elizabeth Bishop
1 General secretary of the USSR’s Communist Party N. S. Khrushchev paid an official visit
to Egypt to  celebrate  the  completion  of  the  first  stage  of  the Aswan  High  Dam  in
May 1964;1 Egypt’s president Gamal Abdul Nasser served as tour guide, escorting the
nation’s guest on an excursion to the Egyptian Museum.2 Following numerous chains of
signification for these two men’s tour enable us to address Egypt’s Pharaonic past in
multiple mirrors.
2 While touring the Egyptian Museum, Nasser drew his guest’s attention to objects on
display: three gold representations of flies, joined by a chain (CG 52671), dating from
the  second  intermediate  period’s  17th  Dynasty.  The  current  catalog  description
characterizes these as “stylized flies formed of plaques of gold with two bulgingeyes
and an open work body.” These had been excavated from the tomb of Queen Ahhotep I
(ca.  1560-1530  BC),  consort  to  King  Skenenra  Taa II;  both  King  Kamose  and  King
Ahmose I were her children. When Kamose died during a struggle against the Hyksos,
his brother Ahmose ascended to the throne, and Queen Ahhotep served as regent until
he came of age. A stele in the temple of Amun-Re at Karnak identified Queen Ahhotep
as, “Princess, king’s mother, noblewoman who knows things and takes care of Egypt”;3
the stele further commemorated her role in the war against the Hyksos, stating, “she is
the one who has accomplished the rites and taken care of Egypt; she has looked after
Egypt’s troops and she has guarded them, she brought back the fugitives and collected
together the deserters, pacified Upper Egypt and expelled her rebels.”4
3 When Ahhotep died,  she was buried with extraordinary funerary jewelry,  including
three gold pendants in the form of flies.5 About the size of an outstretched human
hand,  they  are  “flat  and  simple,  with  only  the  head  and  wings  delineated.”6
Semantically,  flies  are  connected  with  vanquished  enemies.  Found  on  battlefields
where blood has been shed, the hieroglyphic determinative sign for the noun “fly” (‘ff),
the  verb  “to  fly”  (‘ff),  and  the  phoneme  “aff”  (‘ff)  signifying  both  “rejection”  and
“bother,” are all connected with the idea of shooing away enemies.7 At the same time,
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flies represent a martial idea; like them, soldiers should be numerous, persistent, and
impossible to ward off.8 Biting insects represented military valor and tenacity; both the
fly and the exemplary general returned to torment their victims.9
4 To find such a military award in the jewelry collection of  a  queen is  exceptional,10
although these pendants are not entirely unique. On display in the same museum are
also smaller gold and silver Dipterae. A necklace with thirty-three small pendants was
found in the tomb of Thutmose III’s three wives.11 During the New Kingdom, Egypt’s
military was in the process of becoming a privileged, prosperous class, representing
one of the few paths to status and wealth for a young man born in poverty.12 Similar
pendants  were  awards  presented  to  commanders  of  victorious  armies.  In  his
autobiography, General Ahmose-pen-Nekhbet recorded, “King Thutmose I gave to me
of gold: four bracelets,  four necklaces, one amulet,  six flies,  three lions, two golden
axes.”13 Royal Butler Suemniwet also received a golden fly; his tomb (Theban, no. 92)
depicted war materiel, including Syrian-style helmets, armor, chariots, and weapons.14
Royal messenger Dedi wore a golden fly with striding lions (Thebian, no. 200), an award
that  (according  to  the  Annals  of  Thutmose III)  he  had  received  during  Syrian
campaigns.15
5 In his discussion of ancient Egyptian art’s reception according to the critical standards
of Hellenic antiquity, Michael Podro points to a key issue for art history: can the art of
one  culture  be  understood  by  another  as  “art”?  “Appreciation  of  the  artistry  of
artwork, enjoyment of the way it transformed its ritual or symbolic material, does not
enable  us  to  overcome  the  problem  of  cultural  difference.”16 Acknowledging  that
Frances Stonor Saunders identified institutional bases for cultural politics of the Cold
War,17 this essay places Queen Ahhotep’s golden flies at the center of the problem of
militarization  and  cultural  difference  during  World  War II  and  the  following  two
decades.
6 In the postcolonial era, the global circulation of Pharaonic antiquities reflected that of
advanced weapons systems, as the servants of Egypt’s state exported antiquities from
the postcolonial  Nile  Valley  at  a  rate  that  rivaled nineteenth-century imperialism’s
treasure hunt. As state gifts, a striding male figure from 2400 BC went to US First Lady
Jacqueline Kennedy;18 her husband received a hand-carved ivory model of an ancient
barge.19 A vase excavated at Sakkara went to the chair of the USSR Communist Party N.
S. Khrushchev, who (it was said) set it on the table in the middle of a Supreme Soviet
meeting.20
7 Khrushchev’s  1964  Cairo  visit  represented  the  culmination  of  improvement  in  the
relationship between the two countries.21 Closer scrutiny reveals that this museum visit
performs important contextual work for art history and criticism. This essay identifies
multiple “mirrors” for Egypt’s Pharaonic artifacts. Noting that both the (temporary)
museum  docent  and  his  (civilian)  guest  had  extensive  wartime  experience,  this
discussion will  interweave  the  multiple  (and  even  contradictory)  significations  of
Queen Ahhotep’s golden flies with those of the two men’s military careers.
8 A  generation  older  than  his  host,  Khrushchev  had  been  promoted  in  1928  to  the
organization department of the Communist Party’s district committee in Kiev, at the
beginning of what subsequently came to be known as the Holodomor,  the “Ukrainian
famine.” While Soviet authorities had procured 7.2 million tons of wheat from the 1931
harvest, the following year yielded only 4.3 million tons. In towns, the authorities cut
citizens’  access  to  rations,  while  popular  propaganda  portrayed  peasants  as
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counterrevolutionaries  who  hid  grain  and  potatoes  from  the  workers.  By
February 1933,  the  Dnipropetrovsk, Kiev  (where  Khrushchev  was  a  young  Party
employee), and Odessa districts were most affected, reporting starvation, typhus, and
malaria; in April, Kharkhiv reported mass deaths from starvation.
9 Gold,  and the militarization of  its  transfer,  can be held responsible  for  the famine.
Refusing to accept specie payments after 1925, the USSR’s Ministry of Foreign Trade
was left bartering oil, timber, and grain for imports. When the UK prohibited imports
of Soviet butter, petroleum, and timber in April 1933, the Ministry was left paying for
the nation’s imports in grain—until London banned barley and wheat, too, in July 1933.
At the same time, the instigation of collective agriculture in the Ukrainian SSR imposed
new  crops,  such  as  cotton  and  sugar  beets.  Many  agricultural  managers  (like
Khrushchev) were inexperienced; as a result, many farms’ grain was left standing in the
fields,  or  was  lost  in  processing,  transportation,  and  storage.  By  the  end  of  1933,
millions  of  people  had  starved  to  death  in  the  Ukraine  and  surrounding  areas.  In
addition to the toll on human lives, perhaps two million horses, four million head of
cattle, six million sheep, and five million swine were slaughtered, died of disease, or
starved.  By the end of  that  terrible  year,  Khrushchev was promoted to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).
10 The Party also bears responsibility. CPSU chair Iosif Vissarionovich Jugashvili, “Stalin,”
sent  Khrushchev  (as  chair  of  the  Council  of  People’s  Commissars),  along  with
Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov (who, at the time, was
head  of  the  party’s  department  of  special  affairs,  department  of  personnel,  and
department of industry) to the Ukraine. Their orders were to liquidate both the local
parliament and the local party leadership. In both tasks they failed, at least initially.
The republic’s central committee plenum rejected Khrushchev’s bid to serve as their
general  secretary.  In  response,  all  seventeen  members  of  Premier  Lubchenko’s
government were taken into custody; of sixty members of the republic’s party’s central
committee and its candidate members, only three survived. Khrushchev was appointed
“general secretary” of a central committee of the Ukrainian party that had ceased to
exist.  He and his associates were prepared to use such tactics to extend the USSR’s
western border.
11 Shortly afterwards, Soviet troops entered Polish territory in accordance with the terms
of  the  Molotov-Ribbentrop  pact.22 There,  the  Red  Army  set  up  “provisional
administrations”  in  urban  areas  and  “peasant  communities”  in  the  countryside  to
organize  elections.23 Khrushche v  continued  to  serve  as  general  secretary  of  the
Ukraine’s Communist Party.24 Through a combination of propaganda, single-candidate
ballots,  and  fraud,  they  formed  a  “People’s  Assembly  of  Western  Ukraine.”25
Khrushchev and other representatives of the Ukrainian SSR addressed this assembly,
which  then  voted  unanimously  to  thank  Stalin  for  liberation,  requesting  formal
inclusion in the Ukrainian SSR.26 On June 22, 1941, nearly three-quarters of a million
Axis  soldiers  and  their  allies  exploded  across  the  western  border,27 entering  the
country both north and south of the Pripet Marshes simultaneously.28 Weakened by
famine, towns and villages welcomed German troops as liberators.29 Marshal Semyon
Mikhailovich  Budyonny  (Commander-in-Chief  of  Soviet armed  forces  of  the
Southwestern Direction), and General Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko (recently
transferred  from  Smolensk)  supported  Khrushchev.  In  his  memoirs,  he  recalled:
“several times Timoshenko and I went out to visit the troops… as I recall, we went out
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into  the  area  west  of  Poltava.  There  we  had  a  mechanized  group  commanded  by
General Feklenko. When Feklenko saw us his eyes literally popped, out of surprise or
fear. We asked him to report on the situation. He reported briefly and immediately
said: ‘you’ve got to get away from here, and hurry!’ The situation was so difficult that
he could not be sure of our safety.”30
12 Stalin refused to recognize that the military units in and around Kiev were in danger of
being  encircled.  When  the  NKVD  informed  him  that  Khrushchev  was  about  to
surrender the city, Stalin phoned to cajole and threaten the subordinate: “you should
be ashamed of yourself!… what’s the matter with you? [you have] given up half the
Ukraine. You’re ready to give up the other half too… Do whatever it takes—if not, we’ll
make  short  work  of  you!”  Stalin  transferred  military  command  from  Budyonny  to
Timoshenko; two days later, Panzer Groups One and Two linked up a hundred miles
east of Kiev. The Germans surrounded Kiev on September 14; five Soviet armies were
sealed in the encirclement.31 Stalin authorized withdrawal, too late. Khrushchev was
left with the responsibility of evacuating industrial plant, “working livestock, grain,
tractors, and combines,”32 from the besieged city.33 As the Soviet Southwestern Front
armies collapsed and 452,720 men were taken prisoner,  Kiev was abandoned to the
enemy.34 Some 15,000 troops nonetheless managed to slip the cordon around Kiev, 35
while Khrushchev, Budyonny, and Timoshenko were evacuated by air.36
13 During  the  1964  state  visit,  as  Nasser  guided  Khrushchev  through  the  Egyptian
Museum,37 t he  guest  expressed  his  pleasure  with  a  brief  sentence:  “Visiting  these
antiquities and knowing their history should take no less than ten years.”38 Host and
guest lingered over the display of three golden flies from the 17th Dynasty. Both had
seen active military service;  Khrushchev on the Ukranian front,  and Nasser sixteen
years previously.
14 Seeking to explain his experiences of the Palestine campaign for a popular audience,
Nasser described a Hollywood film he had seen in a Cairo cinema. “The story had a
villain,  who  had  succumbed  to  the  evil  machinations  of  the devil,”  he  began  his
narrative; “this villain commits murder but plans his crime in such a way that suspicion
is thrown on an innocent man.”39 Egypt’s  offensive began on May 14,  1948,  the day
Israel declared its independence.40 King Farouk entered the war against the advice of
military leaders, Prime Minister Mahmud Nuqrashi, and all the leading political parties.
41
15 At that time, Egypt’s army was made up of nine battalions; three were on the border,
with a fourth on its way. All students in their senior year at the Staff College, Zakariya
Mohieddin was ordered to join the 1st battalion, Nasser the 6th, and Abdul Hakim Amer
the  9th.  Immediately  after  their  graduation  ceremonies,  the  three  men  received
“orders were that we should leave Cairo on 16 May.” Sharing a taxicab to the train
station, having boarded civilian transport, they “spread out a large map between us
and began to discuss the situation; at first glance there loomed before our eyes the
‘gaps’ in our position through which our lines could be threatened.”42
16 Arriving at the Sinai town of al-Arish, they found the military headquarters “like an
abandoned house in the middle of uninhabited territory; when we finally found the
officer  on duty,  he  was  looking for  a  dinner  for  himself.”  Since  the  three  officers’
respective battalions were located in Gaza and Rafah, the three men parted. Rafah, to
which Nasser was assigned, was backed by a troop of armored cars, twenty Bren gun
carriers,43 batteries  of  twenty-five  pounders,  and twenty Locust  tanks. 44 Arriving at
Golden Flies: Egypt’s Pharaonic Past in Multiple Mirrors
Dialogues artistiques avec les passés de l'Égypte
4
Rafah, he heard about events that had taken place at Kibbutz Narim (Dangour), a town
halfway to Gaza.
17 There, forty-odd defenders had managed to contain sustained Egyptian assaults,45 as
the  Egyptians  conducted  slow-moving  frontal  attacks  in  line  abreast.46 As  Nasser
recalled, “the men were given no time to rest and ordered to attack the wire perimeter
at once. No one really knew how to set about it, although the defenders of Dangour
were quite clear about their job. The [Egyptian] battalion suffered unexpected losses,
and about noon the commanding officer ordered it to retire from the settlement.”47
After a short battle, the Egyptians withdrew, leaving thirty soldiers dead.48 Although
the  Egyptian  infantry  enjoyed  air  support,  in  addition  to  artillery  support,49 the
resistance they encountered nonetheless surprised them.
18 Rather  than  recognizing  that  they  possessed  the  technological  advantage,  the
Egyptians were under the impression that they were technologically disadvantaged.
The young colonel recounted that he listened to an officer “relate how electrically-
operated  towers  rose  above  the  surface  of  the  ground  to  fire  at  our  men  in  all
directions,  after  which  the  towers  disappeared  (still  electrically)  into  the  ground
again.” With such reports ringing in his ears, his battalion returned to Rafah where
they found an official communiqué announcing that the “clean-up” of Dangour had
been successful.50
19 Nasser  asked,  “What  kind  of  war  was  this?  Our  infantry  was  being  expended  in  a
terrible way in exposed, broad daylight attacks. Bare bodies unprotected by armor were
being pitted against strongly fortified positions and guns manned by competent, well-
trained defenders.”  While  Egyptian infantrymen had shown courage,  they  were  ill-
equipped, and their central command lacked proper planning. “Was this a battle into
which we were leading our troops, or a massacre?”51
20 Egyptians,  civilians,  and military were touched by that year’s  military events. 52 The
country’s performance in the 1948 war bruised national pride; a munitions scandal (the
Palace  had  purchased  defective  military  equipment,  left  over  from  World  War II)
alienated the population from the political leadership.53 To the Muslim Brotherhood’s
young members, events in Egypt revealed the Arab regimes’ total bankruptcy.54 Either
an Egyptian revolution had been going on since 1946 (in which case the Palestine War
was an unsuccessful attempt to abort it that had only succeeded in delaying it, shaping
its early course and objectives and giving it renewed impetus),55 or it was in Palestine
that a conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy was born.56 Either way, the “free officers”
of  Egypt,  led  by  Mohammed  Naguib,  took  control  of  the  government  in  July 1952,
replacing King Farouk.57
21 For  Egypt’s  new  government,  advanced  military  systems  would  enable  them  to
overcome soldiers’ impression that the enemy had “electrically-operated towers.”The
question was, how could the “free officers” government break the monarchy’s reliance
on  British  military  assistance?  While  the  terms  of  a  1936  treaty  with  Britain  had
restricted the Egyptian government to British-provided supplies, the agreement had
expired the year before the Palestine campaign.58
22 Records from Great Britain’s embassy in Cairo reflect diplomats’ self-congratulation on
(what they thought was) a renewal of the 1936 treaty’s military provisions. The British
ambassador’s annual report for 1954 began that the year “was remarkable both for the
efforts displayed by the men of the régime and for the results achieved.”59 Even though
British diplomats and their counterparts among the “free officers” had failed to agree
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on the emergency circumstances by which foreign troops would be permitted to return
to the Suez base,60 Britain simply kept “her powerful armed forces at full strength in
the Suez Canal zone.”61 Britain offered, however, to evacuate all 80,000 troops from the
Suez bases if Egypt would permit them to return in the event of a war.62 Constrained by
declining  military  budgets,63 and  acknowledging  that  nuclear  weapons  had  altered
strategic  considerations  around  the  world,64 Britain’s  diplomats  had  succeeded  in
transferring the nation’s military responsibility elsewhere in the region (Iraq) over to
the United States, and may have considered doing so in Egypt as well.65 By October,
diplomats finally arrived at an agreement governing the Suez bases, establishing terms
for a phased withdrawal—to begin in a year’s time.66
23 In the final phases of talks, Egypt’s deputy premier Gamal Salem suggested that Egypt
was open to a new offer for weapons; “If European countries would not fulfill  their
promises and contracts for arms, Egypt had no alternative but to accept” any new offer.
67 Those  who  listened  to  Cairo  Radio  and  read  the  al-Jumhuriyahh (“ The  Republic”)
newspaper already knew Egypt’s head of state considered “a visit to the Soviet Union
[to] significantly demonstrate that Egyptian policy and actions are not inspired by any
foreign influence or pressure and that Egypt can freely make any decision at any time
she  wishes  to  do  so.”68 Similarly,  editors  at  the  Soviet  newspaper  Izvestia (“ News”)
praised  Egypt’s  “opposition  to  the  policy  of  military  alliances  with  the  Western
powers.”69
24 Nasser  announced  on  September 27,  1955,  that  his  country  had  signed  an  arms
agreement with “Czechoslovakia” for Soviet-manufactured weapons.70 This  shocking
new direction had been developing in secret for six months, after Nasser attended an
international  meeting  in  Indonesia.71 The  organizers  of  the  Bandung  Afro-Asian
solidarity conference were prepared to elevate Nasser’s stature among the conference
attendees; Egypt’s premier “went to Bandung an Egyptian, and returned a world figure
and a revolutionary.”72
25 It is commonly accepted that, during the meeting, Zhou Enlai pledged China’s support
for  the  Algerian,  Moroccan,  and  Tunisian  peoples  in  their  struggle  for  national
liberation, an important issue for Nasser’s policy of Arab unification;73 and that it was
Zhou Enlai who advised the African leader to approach the Soviet bloc for weapons.74 It
has also been argued that the so-called Czech-Egyptian arms deal (announced officially
in September 1955) was a combination of two separate contracts: a first one concluded
between Egypt and Czechoslovakia during the first quarter of the year, followed by a
second, larger contract drawn up between Egypt and the Soviet Union after Nasser’s
return  from  Bandung.  Czechoslovakia  adhered  to  this  second  agreement  (a  direct
continuation of the first) in September 1955.75
26 Within a month, six Eastern-bloc freighters arrived at Egypt’s two Mediterranean ports.
“Despite elaborate Egyptian security precautions, it has been definitely established that
at least one of the Port Said arrivals carried jet plane wings on deck,” totaling two
hundred jets, among them MIG-15 fighters and IL-28 bombers, as well as tanks, torpedo
boats,  “and  two  submarines.”76 While  precise  data  on  the  value  of  those  weapons
shipments  has  proven  elusive,  and  while  the  conditions  of  payment  were  never
published,77 the  agreement  reportedly  provided for  repayment  in  cotton shipments
over an extended period.78
27 Nearly a quarter of a million British soldiers and their allies burst across Egypt’s Sinai
border  on  October 29,  1956.  After  the  “tripartite  invasion,”  Egyptian  and  Soviet
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diplomats urgently negotiated deliveries for aircraft, tanks, and other equipment. The
first half of 1957 saw a first shipment of supersonic aircraft, TU-104 transport planes,
six  ships  built  in  Poland,  and  three  W-class  submarines.79 While  Khrushchev  later
reported to the CPSU XXI congress that the country “had not interfered and does not
intend to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries,”80 the military capability
of Egypt had doubled.81
28 By the time Khrushchev entered the Egyptian Museum six years later, the Soviet Union
had provided Egypt with $600 million in materiel.82 When Nasser guided Khrushchev
past  the display of  Queen Ahhotep’s  golden flies,  Egypt had succeeded in replacing
Great Britain with the Soviet Union as its leading weapons dealer.
29 Face to face with Queen Ahhotep’s golden flies, Khrushchev responded with a casual,
yet  polite,  remark  that  such  ancient objects  were  very  much  in  keeping  with
contemporary  artistic  tastes.83 Un derstood  as  a  compliment  by  his  Egyptian
interlocutors, his comment cut to the heart of the Cold War’s cultural politics.
30 Since the 1940s, a shift had been occurring in global art, from regionalism’s accessible
themes to the non objective art  of  “abstract  expressionism.”84 Among the member-
states  of  the  emerging  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization,  various  cultural  and
political  entities  deployed  this  second  style  of  painting  as  a  “weapon  against
totalitarianism,”85 in  that  it  coincided  fairly  closely  with  an  ideology  that  came  to
dominate  American  public  life  after  the  1948  presidential  election.86 Indeed,
nonrepresentational  paintings  by  US  artists  described  in  terms  of  “abstract
expressionism”—such  as  those  of  Mark  Rothko,  among  others—were  described  as
celebrations of a sense of individual freedom which characterized the Cold War West.87
31 Through a series of connections—including combatants’ embodied experience of war
and  artists’  relationships  to  a  variety  of  government  organizations—Khrushchev
seemed to have identified Queen Ahhotep’s golden flies as a distant “mirror” for the
artwork of Willem de Kooning, Barnett Newman, and Jackson Pollock.88 De Kooning’s
paintings,  such  as  his  Pink  Angels (1945),  contain  inter-textual  allusions  to  earlier
paintings; in Newman’s “zip” paintings, including OnementI (1948), the zip divides the
smooth,  dominant,  single-colored  surface  of  the  canvas  in  a  manner  suggesting
rupture; Pollock’s Autumn Rhythm: Number 30 (1950) “does not ‘look’ like things.”89
32 The Soviet Union’s Academy of Arts employed sculptors and painters. In addition to
offering “official” artists commissions, prizes, and conferences to discuss their work,
and shipping supplies to their rent-free studios,90 it was less supportive of discussion of
new developments around the art world. The artists’ union had suspended publication
of  its  official  journals—Iskusstvo (“Art”),  Khudozhnik (“Artist”),  and  Tvorchestvo
(“Creativity”)—for the duration of World War II. After the war, when the three journals
resumed publication, the official portrait painter A. M. Gerasimov allied with the chief
of the artists’ union Vladimir Serov to resist the rising tide of a general preoccupation
with the subconscious.91
33 Not all shared Gerasimov, Khrushchev, and Serov’s opinions. After the war, Moscow
artist E. L.  Kropivnitsky obtained reproductions of Salvador Dalí, Paul Klee, and Joan
Miró.92 By  the  mid-1950s,  a  varied  group  of  creative  people  had  gathered  around
Kropivnitsky,  among them his  sons  Leo  and Valentine,  painter  O. Rabin,  and  poets
I. Holin,  E. Limonov,  and  G. Sapgir.93 Sculptor  E. Neizvestny  received  his  medical
discharge from the Red Army when an exploding bullet pierced his chest, shattered his
spine and ribs, and left a crater in his back; after the war ended, a military medical
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commission  examined  him,  finding  him  a  “class II  invalid.”  Following  a  period  of
recuperation,  Neizvestny  went  to  work  at  a  factory  in  Sverdlovsk,  then  taught  art
classes  at  the  Suvorov  Military  Institute.94 Moving  to  Moscow  without  official
kontraktsiia, he sold pieces to nuclear physicists L.D. Landau and P.L. Kapitsa,95 as well as
working anonymously for the studios of established architects.96
34 A series of  exhibits  were planned to introduce this  kind of  artistic  “formalism”—as
abstract  expressionism  was  called  in  Moscow—to  the  Soviet  capital’s  public,  as  an
attempt  to  bridge  the  growing  rift  between  official  and  unofficial  art  worlds.
Khrushchev’s antipathy towardmodern art had already been noticed—he resented its
“radical  novelty,”  its  “impulse  toextreme  individualism,”  its  “valorization  of
inaccessibility.”97 Public  celebrities  such  as  Olympic  weightlifter  F.  Bogdanovsky,
cosmonaut Yu. Gagarin, brigade leader on a construction site G. Lamochkin, and textile
worker V. Petrishcheva characterized abstract expressionism as the “pursuit of cheap
sensations, masked in some cases by empty declarations, [which] drag to exhibitions or
load the airwaves with nonsensical combinations of colors or sounds, and more over
attempt to palm off their wares as innovations.”98 The “radical novelty,” the “extreme
individualism,”  and  “inaccessibility”  of  artistic  formalism  contrasted  with  the
accessible,  collective  establishment  of  athleticism,  scientific  heroism,  and  an
aristocracy of labor.
35 The first of these shows celebrated the 75th birthday of communist artist Pablo Picasso
(1956);99 followed  by  the  “World  Festival  of  Youth  and  Students”  (1957),  with  its
separate pavilions for painting and sculpture;100 then an “Art of Socialist Countries”
exhibit  (1958).101 These,  together  with  an  “Exhibition  of  American  Painting  and
Sculpture,” marked an ottepel (“thaw”) in the visual arts.102 By the early 1960s, as part of
this “thaw,” Neizvestny started work on a series of small-scale bronze casts, described
as  cyborg-hulks;  “quasi-human creatures  beset  by  contortions… uncanny,  deformed
objects.”103 A show of avant-garde art  by Kropivnitsky and others was scheduled to
open  in  the  Hotel Yunost’  (“Youth”)  on  Moscow’s  downtown  Gorky  Street  during
November 1962.  The  Yunost’ artists  hung  their  work  for  a  private  preview  in  the
apartment  of  sculptor  E.  Belyutin;  when  the  authorities  closed  this  unsanctioned
gathering after only a few hours,104 the artists were invited to join the official “30 Years
of  Moscow  Art”  exhibition  scheduled  in  the  Manezh—a  much  larger  and  more
significant venue than either the hotel or the apartment.105 Only a few short steps from
the Kremlin, this 170-meter-long hall served the Soviet empire and its predecessor as
their epicenter.106 Construction of this building—whose name is a distant mirror for the
French manège,  or “riding arena”—was a high point of the city’s revitalization after
Napoleon’s  defeat,  serving Russia’s  Imperial  Cavalry regiments,  then retaining their
name after the October Revolution witnessed conversion of the space to civilian uses.107
36 In this way, a number of artists were added at the last moment to the “30 Years of
Moscow  Art”  exhibition  scheduled  to  open  in  December 1962.  Several  were  World
War II  veterans;  one of these was Neizvestny.108 Following the Manezh opening, four
cabinet  members  and  several  members  of  the  CPSU  secretariat  accompanied
Khrushchev to  view the works.109 The sculptor  recalled that  an entourage of  about
seventy public  figures entered the building,110 among them Serov and Gerasimov. 111
Khrushchev toured the ground-floor halls quietly; only when he reached the top of the
stairs did he begin to shout: “Disgrace! Dog shit! Filth! Pederasts! Who is responsible for
this? Who is the leader?” The sculptor Belyutin stepped forward; somebody among the
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official delegation said: “He’s not the real leader, we don’t want him,” and, pointing at
Neizvestny, “That’s the real leader!”112 
37 Acknowledging  that  accounts  of  what  followed  have  become  part  of  Cold  War
mythology,  the sculptor recalled that  he answered back:  “you may be premier and
chairman but not here in front of my works. Here I am premier and we shall discuss as
equals.”113
38 From among the official entourage, KGB chief A.N. Shelepin barked something like, “If
you continue to behave that way, we’ll let you rot in the uranium mines.”114 The war
veteran related that  he no longer feared death,  which “let  me feel  completely free
inside,” at which point he saw the “attentive, interested, and even sympathetic gaze” of
the man who had evacuated from Kiev by air twenty years earlier. To the Premier, the
Soviet  sculptor  is  said  to  have  replied,  “you  are  insulting  me;  such  outstanding
Communists as [Italian expressionist] Renato Guttuso, Picasso, and [Mexican muralist
David Alfaro] Siqueiros support me and love me.” Khrushchev then answered, “Aha,
I’ve got you. Here you are in front of the number one Communist in the world—that’s
me—and I don’t like your works at all.”115
39 In his exchanges with the authorities, many considered the sculptor to exemplify the
kind of individual freedom associated with art by de Kooning, Newman, and Pollock.116
After the 1962 confrontation with Khrushchev and his entourage, Neizvestny failed to
find work as a professional artist for almost a decade. Since he was unable to sell art
under  his  own name,  rivals  stole  and executed designs  he had submitted for  large
projects, while he found work loading salt at a railroad switchyard.117
40 Seven  years  later,  the  sculptor  learned  of  Egypt’s  international  competition  for  a
monument at the Aswan high dam; a competition that was to be adjudicated by an
international jury with no affiliation to the USSR’s artistic academy.118 For his entry, he
developed an enormous lotus flower design of “leaf formations rising upwards in a
gothic style to a height of two hundred and seventy feet… [with] a giant relief with
motifs from the ‘tree of life.’”119 He managed to smuggle his entry out of the country
and  into  Egypt  before  the  submission  deadline.  As  international  journalists  were
invited  to  be  present  in  Cairo  when the  envelopes  containing  the  jury  votes  were
opened, news of his winning design was made public around the world.120
41 This  success  gained Neizvestny  entry  into  the  official  Soviet  art  world;  it  was  not,
however, his greatest accomplishment. After Khrushchev’s death in 1971, his son S. N.
Khrushchev asked the sculptor for a memorial.  Intertwined white and black marble
blocks (alluding to the contrasts and paradoxes of his public service) frame a head cast
in  bronze.121 The  cemetery  belonging  to  the  historic  Novodevichy  Convent  on  the
Moscow River had been selected as Khrushchev’s final resting place.122 After a four-year
delay,123 this tombstone uniting “formalist” and “realist” elements was finally installed
to mark the leader’s grave.124
 
Conclusion
42 This  essay  has  explored  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  Pharaonic  art  and
Egyptian society, and “formalist” art and Soviet society, through a series of martial
themes.  Queen  Ahhotep  I’s  “golden  flies,”  which  attracted  Nasser’s  attention  and
Khrushchev’s response, were New Kingdom military decorations found in a woman’s
Golden Flies: Egypt’s Pharaonic Past in Multiple Mirrors
Dialogues artistiques avec les passés de l'Égypte
9
tomb. In the Egyptian Museum, the “golden flies” evoked a military history stretching
from the  New Kingdom to  the  Cold  War.  Khrushchev’s  wartime experience  on  the
Soviet Union’s western front reflects the overlap between administrative power and
military  conquest;  similarly,  what  Nasser  saw and heard  during  the  1948  Palestine
campaign  underscored  the  value  of  advanced  weapons  systems.  By  the  time
Khrushchev visited the Egyptian Museum during 1964, the Soviet Union had replaced
Great Britain as Egypt’s leading weapons supplier.
43 As Michael Hatt and Charlotte Klonk point out, “what is at stake for Marxism and social
art history is not the embeddedness of art in society, but the nature of this relationship
and its consequences.”125 This contribution considers the imbrication of ancient and
modern art, with the mid-twentieth century’s changing tides of war and peace. Both
the  Soviet  Communist  Party  leader  and  the  Egyptian  president  had  experience  of
military defeat; both found their experiences contrasted with (and informed by) those
of veterans who had seen active service.
44 Khrushchev’s  measured remarks  before  the  “golden flies”  in  the  Egyptian Museum
distantly echo his response to works exhibited at the Manezh. For Khrushchev, Queen
Ahhotep’s  gold reflected his  conflict  with war veteran Ernest  Neizvestny and those
“uncanny, deformed” sculptures from two years earlier. In the cultural politics of the
Cold War, Khrushchev found the New Kingdom golden flies to also reflect the artwork
of  de  Kooning,  Newman,  and  Pollock.  In  turn,  the  “Thirty  Years  of  Moscow  Art”
exhibition found its own distant mirrors, first in Neizvestny’s design for a monument at
the Aswan High Dam and later in Khrushchev’s Novodevichy monument.
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